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FEDERAL PENALTIES APPLY TO POLLUTION
OF INTERMITTENT STREAMS

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT: Intermittent streams are navigable waters, and a penalty for polluting them is appropriate under federal statute, regardless

of polluter's unintentional act or good faith cleanup. United States v.
Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345 (1Oth Cir. 1979).
A pipeline owned by Texas Pipe Line Company (the Company)
was inadvertently broken, spilling 600 barrels of oil into an unnamed
creek in Atoka County, Oklahoma.' The creek, which had a small
flow at the time of the pipeline spill, fed into Caney Creek, a stream
that fed the Red River via Clear Boggy Creek.2 The area is described
as an alluvial valley with a marginal water supply which is used primarily for public consumption and agricultural irrigation.3
The Company was not at fault in any way for the spill; the accident was caused by a bulldozer operator who struck one of the Company's pipelines while working for a local farmer.4 By prompt action,
the Company managed to recover all but 90 barrels of the spill.'
Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma entered summary judgment against the Company, upholding a fine of $2500 assessed by the United States Coast Guard
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 6 for polluting navigable waters. 7
The Company appealed, claiming that the unnamed tributary was
not "navigable waters" within the meaning of FWPCA. The Company
also contended that the unintentional nature of the spill and the
1. This small county in southeastern Oklahoma is approximately 30 miles from the Red
River, which borders Oklahoma and Texas. WEBSTER'S GEOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY
821 (1969).
2. United Statesv. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 346-47 (10th Cir. 1979).
3. NATIONAL ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 25, 121, 123, 127,
185 (1970).
4. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979).
5. Id.
6. 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). The goal of this act is to restore
and maintain the integrity of the nation's waters by eliminating pollutants in these waters.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
7. 33 U.S.C. § § 1321(b)(6)(A)(B) (1976) provides the fine shall not be less than $500
nor more than $5000 determined by the number of units of pollutants discharged. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(7) (1976) defines navigable waters as "waters of the United States."
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Company's quick, good faith cleanup efforts should be mitigating
factors in assessing penalties under FWPCA.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the unnamed Atoka
County stream met the definition of navigable waters, that the fine
assessed by the United States Coast Guard was appropriate, and that
intent was not a total mitigating factor in determining this particular
pollution penalty under FWPCA. s
According to the court, the commerce clause9 allows broad interpretation of the term "navigable waters" under FWPCA. 1 0 The court
found that "[i] t makes no difference that a stream was or was not at
the time of the spill discharging water continuously into a river navigable in the traditional sense."' I Citing one of its previous holdings,
the court concluded that the intent of FWPCA was to cover all tributaries to waters like the Red River.' 2
Even though the Company was not found at fault, the court found
that a penalty may be assessed regardless of the polluter's intent or
fault.' I FWPCA requires that notice be immediate so that cleanup
can begin at the source. I' The court, in the instant case, found the
Company's actions were no more than conformance to FWPCA requirements of notification.
The court also found that the assessment of the penalty, the opportunity for hearing, and the $2500 fine (one-half of the statutory
maximum) were all well within the statute guidelines.' I The Coast
Guard assessment officer had determined the fine was not detrimental
to such a large company and that $2500 was adequate to finance
cleanup of a spill of this size. The officer minimized the fine because
of the Company's diligence and prompt action in recovery of the oil
discharge. Finding that all factors required by FWPCA were taken
into account in determining the size of the penalty, the tenth circuit
court affirmed the summary judgment entered against the Company.' 6
Judge Barrett, concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted "it
8. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976).
11. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979).
12. Id., citing United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979) (a
gold leaching process found to pollute navigable waters within the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act although the stream itself was not navigable nor used for transportation of
goods or materials).
13. United States v. Texas Pipeline Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1976).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976) provides penalty assessment based on the size of the
business itself, how much effect a fine will have on the continued operation of that business,
and the seriousness of the violation; 33 U.S.C. § 1320(c) (1976) provides for a hearing
board to be appointed by the FWPCA Administrator to conduct public hearings.
16. United States v. Texas Pipeline Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979).
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would appear that the sole basis for the assessment relates to the
need for collection of funds in the nature of penalties."' ' Although
Judge Barrett agreed with the holding on the definition of navigable
waters and that good faith and prompt notice did not mitigate the
penalty entirely, he favored remanding for a precise statement concerning the rationale behind this particular penalty assessment.' 8
Judge Barrett was concerned with the lack of defenses, the automatic
assessment of penalties, and the penal or retributive purposes of fines
under the FWPCA. He was also concerned with the criminal nature
of the penalty and the safeguards that should, in his opinion, be afforded to those who violate the act.' 9 The United States Supreme
Court has recently resolved this issue however, finding the FWPCA
fine a civil penalty.' 0 However, Judge Barrett also raised the issue of
the purpose and use of the fines collected, asking whether they are
assessed purely to cover administrative costs or whether they are indeed related to clean up expenses.
CONCLUSION
The majority in United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co. conformed
to previous decisions in the tenth circuit. The court followed the
standard interpretation of the commerce clause and relevant portions
of the FWPCA. In affirming the decision of the lower court, it relied
heavily on Coast Guard assessment officers' report.
The concerns of dissenting Judge Barrett were later partially resolved in United States v. Ward, 2 ' which held that a fine, like that
assessed here, is civil, not criminal in nature. An issue still unresolved,
however, is whether the penalties must relate to the actual costs of
cleanup. Future decisions may reach the issue of the relationship between fines and actual cleanup costs.
ANN FINLEY WRIGHT
17. Id at 348.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979), citing
Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir.), rev'd sub nor. United States v. Ward,
100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980). United States v. Ward was decided after United States v. Texas Pipe
Line Co. The issue in Ward v. Coleman was whether the requirement of self-reporting of polluting streams violated the self-incrimination protection of the United States Constitution.
The tenth circuit held that when assessing penalties, some other independent evidence of
pollution besides that which the polluter volunteers must be used in determining damage
and assessing penalties. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1194 (1979). Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in the United States Supreme Court opinion, held that penalties under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act are civil in nature and not subject to criminal safeguards for
violators who are required under the act to give notice when pollutants are discharged.
United States v. Ward, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2640-41 (1980).
20. See note 19supra.
21. Id.

